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Comment of Legal Scholars On Authority To Require Supervision and Regulation of 
Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, RIN 4030-AA00 
 
May 13, 2019 
 
 
Submitted electronically 
 
Financial Stability Oversight Council 
Attn:  Mark Schlegel 
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Room 2208B 
Washington, D.C. 20220 
 
Dear Mr. Schlegel:   
 
Please see the submission below in response to the notification of the interpretive guidance 
titled Authority To Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial 
Companies, RIN 4030-AA00, proposed by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC or 
the Council).  We are legal scholars specializing in financial regulation and systemic risk.*  
Thank you for the opportunity to submit these comments for your consideration. 
 
 
Jeremy C. Kress 
Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan Ross School of Business 
Former Attorney, Legal Division, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
 
Patricia A. McCoy  
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School 
Former Assistant Director, Mortgage Markets, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
 
Daniel Schwarcz 
Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law 
University of Minnesota Law School 
 
  
                                           
 
*  Our affiliations are for identification only and do not necessarily represent the views of our universities.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
We urge the Council not to adopt its proposed interpretive guidance, which would substantially 
overhaul its approach to nonbank systemic risk. The proposed guidance would diminish 
FSOC’s capacity to respond to financial stability threats by effectively eliminating entity-based 
nonbank systemic risk regulation and substituting an ineffectual activities-based approach.  It 
would thereby expose the financial system to the same risks that it experienced in 2008 as a 
result of distress at nonbanks like AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers. 
 
We make three main points in this letter: 
 
First, the Council should not rely primarily or exclusively on an activities-based approach 
to nonbank systemic risk.  An effective activities-based approach is not possible in the United 
States because FSOC lacks legal authority to implement activities-based reforms directly.  
Moreover, pervasive jurisdictional fragmentation in the current U.S. regulatory framework 
will undermine efforts to enact and enforce uniform, consistent activities-based rules. 
 
Second, the Council must retain a robust entity-based designation approach to effectively 
mitigate the risk of systemic nonbank failures.  Designations of systemically important 
nonbank financial institutions (SIFIs) are uniquely capable of preventing systemic insolvencies 
of nonbanks through consolidated prudential regulation and supervision.  Moreover, an entity-
based approach is better suited to deterring nonbanks from seeking out systemic risk and is 
easier to implement than an activities-based approach. 
 
Third, the Council should not adopt ill-advised procedural barriers to nonbank SIFI 
designations. Mandatory quantitative cost-benefit analyses and assessment of a firm’s 
vulnerability to distress would make it nearly impossible for the Council to designate new 
nonbank SIFIs and for any such designations to survive judicial review.  Furthermore, the 
proposed guidance misconstrues nonbank SIFI designations as an emergency response tool, 
when in fact such designations must be used prophylactically to mitigate nonbank systemic 
risk. 
 
Accordingly, we strongly urge FSOC to reject the proposed guidance and instead rigorously 
police the financial system for systemic risks under its current procedures.  The comments that 
follow are substantially based on our forthcoming law review article,1 companion book 
chapter,2 and congressional testimony on entity- and activities-based approaches to nonbank 
systemic risk.3  
                                           
 
1 See Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Entities and Activities:  
Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3238059. 
2 Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, Activities Are Not Enough!: Why Nonbank SIFI 
Designations Are Essential to Prevent Systemic Risk, in SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: TEN YEARS 
AFTER THE GREAT CRASH (Douglas W. Arner, Emilios Avgouleas, Danny Busch & Steven L. Schwarcz eds., 
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Comment of Legal Scholars On Authority To Require Supervision and Regulation of 
Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, RIN 4030-AA00 
 
The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated unequivocally that nonbank financial firms such as 
investment banks and insurance companies can propagate systemic risk throughout the financial 
system.  In response to the crisis, Congress created FSOC and gave it two complementary 
tools with which to address nonbank systemic risk.  First, under section 113 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, FSOC has the authority to designate an individual nonbank SIFI for enhanced regulation if 
the Council determines that the firm’s material financial distress or “the nature, scope, size, 
scale, interconnectedness or mix of [its] activities” could pose a threat to U.S. financial 
stability.4  This is FSOC’s so-called “entity-based” approach.  Second, under section 120 of 
Dodd-Frank, FSOC may recommend that the primary financial regulatory agencies adopt “new 
or heightened standards or safeguards” for any financial activity that could propagate systemic 
risks.5  This is FSOC’s “activities-based” approach. 
 
At first, FSOC embraced its entity-based SIFI designation authority, identifying four firms—
Prudential, AIG, MetLife, and GE Capital—as systemically important.  But now, just five 
years later, the Council has reversed all of its original nonbank SIFI designations.  These de-
designations appeared to be part of a concerted effort by the Council to de-emphasize—or 
permanently eliminate—nonbank SIFI designations as a regulatory tool.6 
 
These concerns were confirmed when, in March 2019, FSOC issued the proposed guidance. 
The Council’s proposal would effectively replace nonbank SIFI designations with a near-
exclusive emphasis on activities-based nonbank systemic risk regulation.  Indeed, the Council 
states that it “will prioritize its efforts to identify, assess, and address potential risks and 
threats to U.S. financial stability through a process that emphasizes an activities based 
approach.”7  Entity-based nonbank SIFI designations, on the other hand, would be relegated to 
an afterthought and used “only in rare instances such as an emergency situation or if a potential 
threat to U.S. financial stability is outside the jurisdiction or authority of the financial 
regulatory agencies.”8 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
forthcoming 2019). 
3 See Financial Stability Oversight Council Nonbank Designations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., and Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019) (testimony of Professor Jeremy Kress); The Federal Government’s 
Role in the Insurance Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Ins. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
115th Cong. (2017) (testimony of Professor Daniel Schwarcz) [hereinafter Schwarcz Testimony]. 
4 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1). 
5 12 U.S.C. § 5330(a). 
6 See, e.g., Gregg Gelzinis, Don’t Put SIFI Designations on the Back Burner, AM. BANKER (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/dont-put-sifi-designations-on-the-back-burner. 
7 Financial Stability Oversight Council, Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank 
Financial Companies, Proposed Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 9,028, 9,039 (March 13, 2019), available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-03-13/pdf/2019-04488.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Guidance]. 
8 Id. at 9,035.  
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This proposal is dangerously misguided.  An effective activities-based approach to nonbank 
systemic risk is not currently feasible because FSOC lacks statutory authority to order 
activities-based measures on its own and because jurisdictional gaps and fragmentations in the 
U.S. regulatory framework will severely hamper the reach of any activities-based regulation 
that does take place.  Nonbank SIFI designations, on the other hand, are uniquely capable of 
preventing the types of catastrophic insolvencies the financial system experienced in 2008 
through consolidated prudential regulation and supervision of potentially systemic nonbanks.  
 
The Council insists that its proposed activities-based approach would merely supplement, 
rather than displace, nonbank SIFI designations.  But make no mistake: procedural barriers to 
nonbank SIFI designations contained in the proposed guidance would make it nearly impossible 
for the Council to designate new nonbank SIFIs and for any such designation to survive 
judicial review.  Moreover, the Council’s apparent enthusiasm for activities-based nonbank 
regulation rings hollow given that the FSOC has not used its existing statutory authority to 
recommend a single activities-based rule in more than two years under its current leadership. 
 
With the activities-based approach being unrealistic and entity-based designations, for all 
intents and purposes, consigned to the graveyard, we are deeply concerned that the proposed 
guidance will topple virtually the entire U.S. system of nonbank systemic risk regulation, for 
the reasons that we explain in this comment. 
 
I.  AN EFFECTIVE ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THE CURRENT U.S. 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
Activities-based systemic risk regulation faces three significant obstacles in the United States. 
First, FSOC lacks legal authority to order activities-based regulation on its own. The proposed 
guidance would exacerbate that lack of authority by not using the minimal authority that the 
Council does have.  Second, jurisdictional gaps and fragmentation among the primary financial 
regulators will impede efforts to curb nonbank systemic risk through activities-based 
regulation. Third, FSOC’s ability to monitor risks to financial stability from financial activities 
has been hampered by staff and budget cuts at the Office of Financial Research (OFR).   
 
A.  FSOC Cannot Implement Activities-Based Regulation Directly 
 
FSOC faces a threshold challenge in implementing an activities-based approach: the Council 
has no legal authority to promulgate activities-based rules. Instead, FSOC’s activities-based 
authority is solely precatory. Furthermore, under the guidance as proposed, FSOC will not 
even invoke that limited authority except under extraordinary circumstances. 
 
1. FSOC Lacks The Power To Order Activities-Based Regulation 
 
The Council should not rely primarily or exclusively on an activities-based approach to 
nonbank systemic risk because its activities-based authority is quite weak.  Under section 120 
of Dodd-Frank, FSOC may recommend that the primary financial regulators adopt specific 
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activities-based standards.9 But nothing requires an agency to follow FSOC’s recommendation. 
Rather, the agency is free to decline FSOC’s suggestion after “explain[ing] in writing” why the 
agency determined not to follow it.10 
 
An agency might resist implementing activities-based regulations at FSOC’s urging for several 
reasons. For one, the agency might be captured by the financial sector it is supposed to 
regulate.11 Second, an agency might decline a recommendation by the Council to protect its 
regulatory turf. Third, an agency might not be inclined to spend its resources and political 
capital on drafting, implementing, and enforcing a rule that the Council believes is necessary.12  
Fourth, an agency might prioritize a conflicting regulatory objective to preventing nonbank 
systemic risk, especially if it has not historically been a macro-prudential regulator. 
 
Because its activities-based authority is solely precatory, FSOC’s only recourse when an 
agency declines to follow its recommendation is to designate—or threaten to designate—
nonbanks within the agency’s jurisdiction.13 The threat of such a designation might convince an 
agency to adopt the Council’s proposed activities-based regulations because “few agencies 
relish the prospect of losing control over firms . . . that they traditionally regulate.”14 
However, if FSOC relegates the entity-based approach to a measure of last resort and 
establishes onerous procedural barriers to SIFI designations, such threats will lack credibility. 
As a result, agencies will be able to resist the Council’s activities-based recommendations with 
impunity.   
 
                                           
 
9 12 U.S.C. § 5330(a). 
10 Id. § 5330(c)(2). 
11 When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initially resisted FSOC’s recommendation for 
stronger regulation of money market mutual funds (MMMFs), for example, some commentators attributed the 
SEC’s intransigence to the MMMF industry’s influence over SEC policymaking.  See Stewart L. Brown, Mutual 
Funds and the Regulatory Capture of the SEC, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 101, 107–10 (2017); Jill E. Fisch, The 
Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support in Money Market Fund Reform, 93 N.C. L. REV. 935, 940–
41 (2015). 
12 That appears to be what happened when FSOC urged the SEC to adopted heightened regulations for 
MMMFs.  In response to FSOC’s recommendation, the SEC implemented modest MMMF regulations that were 
not as strong as FSOC had initially proposed.  Key members of FSOC expressed displeasure that the SEC’s rules 
did not go as far as FSOC intended.  See Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial Stability 
Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1119 (2015). 
13
 Notably, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner warned the SEC that FSOC would consider designating 
certain asset managers as nonbank SIFIs if the SEC did not implement stricter regulations for MMMFs.  See 
Martha L. Cochran et al., Money Market Fund Reform:  SEC Rulemaking in the FSOC Era, 2015 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 861, 916–40 (2015).  This threat convinced the SEC to adopt parts of FSOC’s recommended MMMF 
regulations, but many observers criticized the SEC for weakening the Council’s proposal.  See, e.g., Sarah N. 
Lynch, SEC’s Long Path to Money Market Fund Reform Ends in Compromise, REUTERS (July 23, 2014), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-moneyfunds-idUSKBN0FS08E20140723. 
14 Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-Frank and the Nonbank Problem, 84 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1861 (2017). 
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2. The Proposed Guidance Erects Misguided And Artificial Hurdles To Invoking 
FSOC’s Section 120 Authority 
 
FSOC’s activities-based power is feeble to begin with. In an ill-advised step, the proposed 
guidance would further weaken the Council’s authority by mandating artificial procedural 
hurdles before the Council could formally recommend new activities-based rules.   
 
Under ideal circumstances, activities-based systemic risk rulemaking is a lengthy process.  By 
law, any activities-based rules FSOC recommends under section 120 must first go through 
time-consuming notice and comment.15  After that, one or more federal financial regulators 
must then adopt a new rule, following notice in the Federal Register and public comment.  
Normally, a fast-track rulemaking takes two years and most rulemakings take longer. 
Moreover, most rules take additional time before they go into effect.   Thus, even if all the 
planets aligned, FSOC made its recommendation quickly, and the agency or agencies involved 
concurred and promulgated an expedited rule, the rule’s effective date would be at least three 
years off.   
 
The proposed guidance, however, would unnecessarily draw out this process even further.  
According to the proposal, if FSOC identified a product, activity, or practice creating a 
potential risk to financial stability in step one of the activities-based approach, in step two it 
would “work with the relevant financial regulatory agencies at the federal and state levels to 
seek the implementation of actions” to address that risk.”16  This cooperative effort, as FSOC 
envisions it, would be anemic in nature, consisting of “information sharing among regulators” 
(which is decidedly not regulation) or publishing recommendations in the Council’s annual 
report (with the delay that that would entail).17  In step three, only if the regulators dragged 
their feet and FSOC later concluded that their actions were insufficient to address the risk to 
U.S. financial stability, would the Council consider issuing a section 120 recommendation.18 
 
The three-step process is ineffectual by design and establishes an unnecessary procedural 
prerequisite to a section 120 recommendation.  As such, the proposal sends a strong and 
worrisome signal that FSOC is not serious about implementing an activities-based approach.  
In further evidence that this signal is ominously correct, FSOC has recommended no new 
activities-based regulation whatsoever under its current leadership. 
 
The potential consequences for the nation’s financial system are grave.  If and when an 
activities-based regulation of an imminent risk became imperative, FSOC would lack the 
flexibility to move quickly.  Even worse, the time-consuming nature of the three-step process 
                                           
 
15 12 U.S.C. § 5330(b)(1). 
16 Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,040; Jeremy Kress, Prudential Hasn’t Earned the Right to Shed SIFI 
Label, AM. BANKER (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/prudential-hasnt-earned-the-
right-to-shed-sifi-label. 
17 Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,031. 
18 Id. at 9,040. 
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could well prevent needed activities-based regulation for systemic risk from ever materializing.  
That, combined with FSOC’s proposal to de-prioritize entity-based regulation, means that both 
pillars of nonbank systemic risk regulation by FSOC are poised to crumble. 
 
B.  Fragmented U.S. Financial Regulation Precludes An Effective Activities-Based 
Approach 
 
Even if FSOC could order federal regulators to adopt activities-based rules, jurisdictional 
barriers would prevent an activities-based approach from effectively curbing nonbank systemic 
risk. As currently configured, the fragmented U.S. regulatory structure is simply incapable of 
overseeing systemically important financial activities on a system-wide basis. 
 
Jurisdictional fragmentation is pervasive in U.S. financial regulation, with both gaps and 
overlaps in the regulatory framework. In some cases, no federal regulator has the requisite 
authority to impose activities-based regulations on relevant nonbank actors, leading to 
potentially systemic activities going unpoliced. In other cases, multiple federal regulators share 
jurisdiction, which can produce inconsistent enforcement and implementation patterns as well 
as critical information gaps. 
  
This Section details these critical structural deficiencies in the United States’ capacity to 
regulate potentially systemic financial activities. To do so, it focuses on eight areas where 
FSOC has identified activities that could potentially threaten U.S. financial stability. Each of 
these activities has one thing in common: there is no single federal regulator that can oversee 
them for systemic risk across the entire financial sector.  Therefore, even if FSOC were to 
make an activities-based recommendation under section 120, jurisdiction fragmentation could 
prevent the primary financial regulators from adequately addressing nonbank systemic risk. 
 
1. Gaps In The U.S. Regulatory Framework Undermine Regulation Of Systemic 
Activities 
 
Important segments of the financial sector lack effective systemic risk regulatory oversight 
because of gaps in the U.S. regulatory framework. This Section examines how gaps in 
insurance, hedge fund, and fintech oversight preclude an effective activities-based approach to 
nonbank systemic risk.  Under the proposed guidance, these gaps would emasculate activities-
based regulation of the affected activities because FSOC will not make section 120 
recommendations where there is “no primary financial regulatory agency . . . for the company 
conducting financial activities or practices identified by the Council as posing risks . . .”19  
Nowhere in the proposal, however, does FSOC come to grips with the enormity of leaving 
such major financial activities as insurance, hedge funds, and nonbank fintech services outside 
                                           
 
19 Id. at 9,041; see also id. at 9,031.  FSOC does say, in that event, that the Council “can consider reporting 
to Congress on recommendations for legislation that would prevent such activities or practices from threatening 
U.S. financial stability.”  Id.  Even with that, FSOC does not commit itself to making those legislative 
recommendations. 
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of the activities-based regulatory perimeter.   
 
a. Insurance Activities 
 
Gaps in insurance regulation demonstrate the limits of FSOC’s activities-based authority. Since 
the financial crisis, FSOC has identified a wide range of insurance company activities as 
potentially systemically risky—for example, life insurance policies with cash surrender or 
redemption rights, guaranteed investment contracts, captive reinsurance, and financial guaranty 
insurance.20 Yet effective activities-based regulation of these types of transactions for systemic 
risk is virtually impossible because of jurisdictional gaps in U.S. insurance regulation. 
 
The states have traditionally regulated U.S. insurance companies, with minimal federal 
involvement. States’ dominance in insurance regulation is rooted in the reverse preemption 
provision of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides that no federal law may invalidate, 
impair, or supersede state laws governing the business of insurance unless the federal law 
specifically relates to the business of insurance.21  
 
This system of state-based insurance regulation creates critical blind spots with respect to the 
regulation of potentially systemic activities. First, not only is FSOC powerless to directly 
address potentially systemic insurance activities like the cash redemption or surrender terms of 
life insurance policies, but so too are all other federal financial regulators. McCarran-
Ferguson’s strictures against federal insurance oversight strip federal agencies of almost all 
authority to implement an FSOC recommendation regarding traditional insurance activities.  
 
Second, even if states were inclined to adopt an FSOC recommendation to regulate an 
insurance company activity more stringently, they would face severe coordination problems. 
States cannot consistently regulate potentially systemic activities of insurance carriers due to 
the independent legal authority of each individual state to regulate insurers conducting business 
in its jurisdiction.  Although states attempt to coordinate their laws, regulation, and 
enforcement through the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, these efforts are 
often inconsistent. States often refuse to implement reforms, or else implement them differently 
than other states.22  
 
  
                                           
 
20 See, e.g., FSOC, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 97–98 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-
reports/Documents/FSOC%202016%20Annual%20Report.pdf; FSOC, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 62 (2011), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOCAR2011.pdf; FSOC, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL 
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING METLIFE, INC. at 9 n.9, 11–14, 16–18, 
22–23 (2014). 
21 Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33–34 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012)). 
22 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 112 (2015).  And 
even when state laws and regulations are harmonious, their enforcement by states often is not.  FED. INS. OFFICE, 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 33–34 (2013). 
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Meanwhile, most states lack the legal authority to implement FSOC-recommended regulations 
for activities conducted outside of chartered insurance subsidiaries. Although several states 
have enacted laws purporting to authorize their insurance commissioners to supervise insurance 
groups domiciled in their states on a consolidated basis, these statutes do not clearly permit 
commissioners to regulate noninsurance or group-wide conduct.23 Even for those states with 
the legal authority to regulate activities conducted outside of insurance entities, some of those 
activities are nevertheless off-limits due to federal preemption.24 And for activities that states 
could reach at the group level, it is hardly clear that they would enforce such regulation 
vigorously. State insurance commissioners have limited experience scrutinizing activities 
conducted within an insurance conglomerate’s noninsurance subsidiaries, a task they did not 
even attempt prior to the financial crisis.25 Further, states lack the system-wide information on 
exposures outside of insurance that effective financial stability oversight demands. Due to weak 
and untested group-wide supervision, insurance conglomerates face few restrictions in 
conducting systemically risky activities within their non-insurance affiliates, as occurred with 
AIG’s CDS and securities lending operations.26  
 
In sum, gaps in group-wide regulation of insurance conglomerates would render an activities-
based approach to insurance activities impotent. In the absence of nonbank SIFI designations, 
therefore, FSOC cannot effectively mitigate systemic risk arising from the insurance sector. 
 
b. Hedge Fund Activities 
 
Regulatory gaps would likewise undermine an activities-based approach to hedge funds. The 
near-failure of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 and its need for a government-
orchestrated private bailout underscored the potential risk that hedge fund activities can pose to 
the larger financial system.27 In recognition of this continued threat, FSOC created an 
                                           
 
23 See Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk Oversight and the Shifting Balance of State and Federal Authority 
Over Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1389, 1425-29 (2015). The Council completely and unlawfully ignored 
this distinction between the states’ supervisory and regulatory powers in its de-designation of Prudential Financial, 
Inc.  See Jeremy C. Kress, The Last SIFI: The Unwise and Illegal Deregulation of Prudential Financial, 71 
STANFORD L. REV. ONLINE 171, 179-81 (2018).  
24 For instance, in 2008, state insurance regulators lacked jurisdiction over the CDS activities of AIG 
Financial Products because the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision exerted field preemption over those activities. 
25 The FSB concluded that the U.S. state-based system of insurance regulation lacks the capacity for 
consolidated group supervision.  FIN. STABILITY BD., PEER REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 32–38 (2013), 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130827.pdf.  In recent years, states have implemented a variety of 
reforms intended to improve their group-level regulation.   But these reforms rely almost exclusively on 
qualitative rather than quantitative constraints and are susceptible to coordination problems among state 
regulators.  See Daniel Schwarcz, A Critical Take on Group Regulation of Insurers in the United States, 5 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 537, 550 (2015).  Moreover, these reforms are new, still developing, and largely untested.  See 
Schwarcz Testimony, supra note 3.  
26 See Schwarcz, supra note 25, at 551–55.  
27 See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENt 10–17 (1999), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-
mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf. 
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interagency working group to monitor systemic risk in the hedge fund industry.28 Because of 
statutory exemptions, however, hedge funds could avoid activities-based systemic risk 
regulation absent congressional action. 
 
Before the financial crisis, hedge funds largely escaped SEC regulation because they operated 
outside of the purview of the federal securities laws. Hedge fund managers were not required 
to register with the SEC, nor were the funds themselves subject to leverage limits and other 
prudential rules that applied to other investment companies, like mutual funds.29 After the 
crisis, Dodd-Frank imposed modest regulatory requirements on hedge fund managers for the 
first time. Dodd-Frank required hedge fund managers to register with the SEC, undergo 
periodic examinations, and file confidential reports containing information on their funds’ 
leverage, counterparty identities and exposures, and trading strategies.30  
 
Dodd-Frank did not, however, impose prudential requirements on hedge funds, nor did it 
authorize the SEC to adopt such regulations. Thus, hedge funds remain exempt from the 
Investment Company Act of 1940—the statutory authority that permits the SEC to regulate 
mutual funds and other investment companies.  The SEC, therefore, currently lacks power to 
adopt activities-based reforms for hedge funds, such as restrictions on specific trading 
practices.31  Even if FSOC wanted to recommend prudential activities-based regulations for 
hedge funds’ activities, it would be unable to do so because the SEC does not itself have the 
authority to implement such rules.  
 
c. Fintech 
 
Similarly, gaps in the U.S. regulatory framework would impede an activities-based approach to 
emerging risks in the fintech sector. FSOC has warned about financial stability threats from 
marketplace lending, payment systems, virtual currencies, and other fintech innovations.32 
Despite these risks, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that “some 
fintech companies may not be subject to any . . . financial oversight.”33 Accordingly, 
                                           
 
28 FSOC, UPDATE ON REVIEW OF ASSET MANAGEMENT PRODUCTS AND ACTIVITIES 20–21 (2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/news/Documents/FSOC%20Update%20on%20Review%20of%20Asset
%20Management%20Products%20and%20Activities.pdf. 
29 Id. at 14; Marco Bodellini, From Systemic Risk to Financial Scandals: The Shortcomings of U.S. Hedge 
Fund Regulation, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 417, 456–59 (2017). 
30 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2012). 
31 Bodellini, supra note 29, at 456–59. 
32 See FSOC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 126-27 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-
reports/Documents/FSOC_2017_Annual_Report.pdf. [hereinafter FSOC 2017 ANNUAL REPORT]. For a discussion 
of fintech’s potential threats to financial stability, see Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019); Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. 
REV. 232, 251 (2018); Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE. 
J. REG. (forthcoming 2019). 
33 GAO, GAO-18-254, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY: ADDITIONAL STEPS BY REGULATORS COULD BETTER 
PROTECT CONSUMER AND AID REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 38 (2018) [hereinafter GAO FINTECH REPORT] (emphasis 
added). 
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activities-based systemic risk regulation of fintech would face serious challenges because, at 
least in some cases, no primary federal financial regulatory agency would have authority to 
implement FSOC’s activities-based recommendations.34 
 
Rapid innovations in the fintech sector have revealed problematic gaps in the oversight of these 
new technologies. Online nonbank marketplace lenders like LendingClub and Prosper, which 
provide financing to consumers and small businesses, are subject to a patchwork of state-based 
licensing requirements but no federal regulation for safety and soundness or systemic risk. 
Likewise, nonbank payment services like PayPal and Venmo face inconsistent state oversight, 
and some fintech payments firms could escape federal and state regulation entirely.35 
Meanwhile, Bitcoin, Ether, and other cryptocurrencies avoid comprehensive federal oversight 
by the CFTC and SEC, whose legal authority to regulate such products is debatable.36 Because 
federal jurisdiction in these areas is unclear at best, activities-based systemic risk regulation 
might be unable to reach important segments of the fintech market. 
 
2. Fragmentation In The U.S. Regulatory Framework Impedes Activities-Based 
Regulation 
 
While some parts of the nonbank financial sector fall within regulatory interstices, other areas 
suffer from the opposite problem: they are subject to regulation by multiple agencies. This 
fragmentation poses serious challenges for activities-based systemic risk regulation.  
Troublingly, the proposed guidance fails to grapple with this problem. 
 
Even if FSOC were to recommend activities-based regulations, jurisdictional fragmentation 
would undermine regulators’ ability to enact and enforce uniform, consistent rules in five 
ways. First, because each financial regulator focuses narrowly on its jurisdiction, no agency 
has a complete view of the risks within the larger financial system. Highly fragmented 
regulators therefore lack sufficient information to implement a holistic, activities-based 
approach. Second, while FSOC could attempt to coordinate among regulators, different 
agencies may nonetheless issue different and sometimes incompatible rules for the same risk. 
Third, even if the agencies did adopt uniform rules, differences in how the agencies interpret 
and enforce regulations could undermine the goal of a uniform, consistent approach to systemic 
risk. Fourth, regulators may engage in a race-to-the-bottom by adopting less stringent 
regulations than other agencies, as each regulator competes to expand its jurisdiction. Finally, 
                                           
 
34 For a discussion of gaps in fintech supervision, see Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 118 MICH. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 47), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3308524. 
35 See Brian Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
129, 144, 153-61 (2017); GAO FINTECH REPORT, supra note 33, at 34, 38.   
36 See Virtual Currencies: The Oversight Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 
115th Cong. 103 (2018) (statement of J. Christopher Giancarlo, Chairman, CFTC); Anna Irrera, U.S. SEC 
Official Says Ether Not a Security, Price Surges, REUTERS (June 14, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
cryptocurrencies-ether/u-s-sec-official-says-ether-not-a-security-price-surges-idUSKBN1JA30Q. 
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under these circumstances, financial institutions may seek out opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage by moving activities to less-regulated parts of the system.  
 
These challenges vastly complicate activities-based regulation of nonbank systemic risk. By 
way of example, this Section examines regulatory fragmentation of five activities that pose 
potential financial stability risks: mortgages, securities, derivatives, short-term funding, and 
cybersecurity. It concludes that fragmentation would create serious challenges if FSOC were to 
attempt an activities-based approach in any of these areas. 
 
a. Mortgages 
 
The central role of mortgages in both the 2008 financial crisis and the 1980s savings and loan 
crisis epitomizes a larger historical trend: the worst global financial crises have involved real 
estate bubbles fueled by lax credit.37 Given the prominence of mortgage credit in financial 
crises, one might expect to find a robust, unified framework for systemic risk oversight of 
mortgages in the United States. To the contrary, federal mortgage regulation is highly 
fragmented.38 This fragmentation renders an activities-based approach to mortgage regulation 
practically unworkable. 
 
Considerable fragmentation stems from differences in the regulation of commercial and 
residential mortgages. Commercial mortgages are subject to lighter federal regulation than 
their residential counterparts. Banks, which dominate commercial mortgage lending, are 
supervised by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, or the OCC, depending on their charters, for 
solvency risk. Separately, commercial mortgage-backed securitizations and REITs undergo 
SEC regulation for risk to investors.39 Commercial mortgages originated by independent 
nonbank lenders generally are not subject to significant federal oversight. 
 
Residential mortgages are subject to most of the same federal regulation as commercial 
mortgages, plus more. For example, the CFPB regulates residential mortgages—by depository 
institutions and nonbank lenders alike—for market conduct risk to consumers. The CFPB has 
virtually exclusive rulemaking authority in that respect, but shares responsibility for 
supervision and enforcement with the federal prudential banking regulators and the Federal 
Trade Commission. Although the CFPB Director sits on FSOC and the CFPB’s rules play an 
important role in constraining systemic risk from home mortgages,40 the Bureau frames its 
                                           
 
37
 See, e.g., CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF 
FINANCIAL FOLLY xliv–xlv, 158–62 (2009).  
38
 There is some systemic risk regulation of mortgages, but it is limited in reach.  The mortgage activities of 
systemically important depository institutions and nonbank SIFIs are subject to financial stability oversight by the 
Federal Reserve. Meanwhile, the joint risk retention rule requires sponsors of certain mortgage-backed securities to 
retain risk.  Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. et al., Six Federal Agencies Jointly 
Approve Final Risk Retention Rule (Oct. 22, 2014). 
39
 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2018). 
40 See Patricia A. McCoy & Susan M. Wachter, Why The Ability-to-Repay Rule Is Vital To Financial 
Stability, ___ GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2020). 
13 
 
 
mission in terms of protecting consumers, not mitigating threats to financial stability. 
 
Additional federal regulation of residential mortgages comes from two main financing 
channels: the government-sponsored entities (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the 
federal insurers and guarantors. The GSEs, under the auspices of their regulator and 
conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), impose extensive requirements on 
the origination and servicing of the residential mortgage loans they buy.41 Meanwhile, the 
Federal Housing Administration, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of 
Agriculture, and the Rural Housing Service (plus their financing arm, Ginnie Mae), heavily 
regulate the home loans they insure or guarantee.42 In light of this fragmentation, even if FSOC 
sought to implement consistent activities-based mortgage regulation for systemic risk, it would 
be hard-pressed to succeed because that jurisdiction is divided among so many federal 
agencies.  
 
b. Securities 
 
U.S. securities regulation is likewise divided because Congress ceded jurisdiction over some 
securities activities of commercial banks to the federal prudential banking regulators—the 
FDIC, OCC, and Federal Reserve.43 This dispersed authority over securities regulation must 
be taken into account in any appraisal of an activities-based approach to systemic risk, given 
the role of banking groups in securitization and the reorganization of leading investment banks 
as financial holding companies under the watch of the Federal Reserve. 
 
In the banking sector, jurisdiction over securities regulation is split between the SEC and 
federal banking regulators, and some federal securities laws do not apply to banks at all. 
Congress exempted banks from important provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities 
Act), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), the Investment Company Act of 
1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 because banks are subject to a comprehensive 
scheme of federal banking regulation.44 In other cases, depository institutions are bound by 
                                           
 
41 See Single Family, Access the Single Family Guides, FANNIE MAE (2018), 
https://www.fanniemae.com/singlefamily/index; The Guide and Forms, FREDDIE MAC (2018), 
http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/guide/; About FHFA, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY (2018), 
https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs. 
42 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING POLICY HANDBOOK 4000.1 
(2018), https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/sfh/ 
handbook_4000-1; GINNIE MAE, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS (2018), 
https://www.ginniemae.gov/about_us/what_we_do/Pages/statutes_regulations.aspx. 
43
 This discussion of securities regulation jurisdiction is heavily informed by Heidi Mandanis Schooner, 
Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441 (1998). 
44
 For example, banks are exempt from broker-dealer registration, examination, and regulation, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78c(a)(4)–(a)(6),78o, 78o-5(a)(1)(A)–(a)(1)(B) (2012), some SEC registration of clearing activities, id. § 
78c(a)(23)(B); see id. §§ 78c(a)(23)(A), 78q-1(b)(1), SEC regulation, supervision, and regulation of common 
investment funds maintained in a fiduciary capacity, id. § 80a-3(c)(3), (c)(6); see id. § 80a-8, and SEC registration, 
supervision, and regulation as investment advisors, id. § 80b-2(a)(11)(A); see id. § 80a-2(a)(20). 
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federal securities laws, but Congress entrusted oversight of those provisions with respect to 
banks and sometimes thrifts to federal prudential banking regulators, not the SEC.45  
 
This division of federal securities jurisdiction among the SEC and three federal banking 
regulators impedes activities-based regulation of securities for systemic risk. It creates one 
system of securities regulation for independent nonbank securities market actors (who are 
regulated by the SEC) and another one for banking companies (whose securities activities are 
regulated by federal banking regulators and are sometimes exempt from federal regulation 
altogether). These two systems produce inconsistent rules and openings for regulatory arbitrage 
that obstruct a unified approach to systemic risk in securities regulation. 
 
c. Derivatives 
 
A similar fragmentation problem bedevils derivatives regulation. Throughout their histories, 
the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) have clashed repeatedly in 
jurisdictional battles over securities and commodities markets.46 Since Dodd-Frank, the 
combative agencies now share legal authority for derivatives that previously had been traded 
over-the-counter (OTC), without regulation. In deference to the historic division of authority 
between the CFTC over futures and the SEC over securities, Congress gave jurisdiction over 
swaps to the CFTC and security-based swaps to the SEC. The two agencies jointly regulate 
“mixed swaps.”47 Notably, while the SEC and CFTC have attempted to coordinate with one 
another,48 they are not required to treat functionally or economically similar swap products or 
entities in an identical manner.49 
 
This fragmented oversight of derivatives markets creates the risk of inconsistent regulations, 
regulatory arbitrage, and a race-to-the- bottom, as discussed above.  If FSOC recommended 
new activities-based derivatives rules, jurisdictional feuds and potentially inconsistent rules and 
                                           
 
4515 U.S.C. § 78l(i).  For covered banks and thrifts, federal prudential banking regulators administer Exchange 
Act Sections 10A(m) (audit committee requirements), 12 (registration requirements for securities traded on national 
securities exchanges), 13 (periodic reporting requirements), 14(a) and 14(c) (on proxy solicitations), 14(d) and 14(f) 
(on tender offers), 15C (government securities brokers and dealers), 16 (on short swing profits), and 17A (on 
transfer agents).   15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1(m), 78l, 78m, 78n(a), (c)–(d), (f), 78o-5(g)(2), 78p, 78q-1(d); see id. § 
78c(a)(34)(B) (defining “appropriate regulatory agency”). 
Sometimes the SEC and federal prudential banking regulators share authority.  For instance, banks and thrifts 
that do not qualify for the exemption for clearing activities must register with the SEC.  Id. § 78q-1(b)(1); see id. § 
78c(a)(23)(B).  However, the prudential banking regulators exercise rulemaking, supervision and enforcement 
jurisdiction over those activities.  Id. §§ 78c(a)(34)(B), 78q-1(d). 
46
 See Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 574–81 
(2009). 
47
 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(8), (b)(1)–(2). 
48
 See, e.g., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
AND THE U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION REGARDING COORDINATION IN AREAS OF COMMON 
REGULATORY INTEREST AND INFORMATION SHARING (June 28, 2018).  Congress anticipated that this division of 
authority would produce tension between the two historic rivals and enacted a host of provisions to mediate future 
disputes.  See 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a), (b)(1)–(b)(2), (c), (d)(1), (d)(3). 
49
 Id. § 8302(a)(7)(B). 
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enforcement by the SEC and CFTC could thwart effective systemic risk regulation. 
 
d. Short-Term Securities Financing 
 
Fragmented regulatory jurisdiction would likewise undercut an activities-based approach to 
short-term securities financing, such as repo agreements and securities lending. These short-
term liabilities pose real threats to financial stability, as an institution’s rapid loss of such 
funding can spread systemic risk. Recognizing these risks, FSOC has warned that short-term 
securities financing “must be carefully managed and subjected to appropriate oversight.”50 
Comprehensive, activities-based oversight of short-term securities financing is nearly 
impossible, however, because jurisdiction over repo and securities lending is fractured among 
a multiplicity of regulators. 
 
Fragmented jurisdiction over short-term securities financing stems from its near-ubiquitous use 
in different financial sectors. Broker-dealers, hedge funds, banks, pension funds, mutual funds, 
insurance companies, central banks, sovereign wealth funds, and endowments commonly 
borrow through repo or securities lending.51 Many of these same institutions also participate on 
the opposite side of these transactions by providing short-term funding to counterparties. 
Indeed, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, MMMFs, banks, governments, 
GSEs, securities dealers, and hedge funds are major cash investors in both repo and securities 
lending.52 
 
Given the diversity of institutions that engage in short-term securities financing, numerous 
federal and state regulators assert jurisdiction over this conduct. For example, the SEC 
oversees the repo activities of registered investment companies and U.S. broker-dealers, often 
in tandem with the Federal Reserve, which regulates the BHC parent companies of many 
broker-dealers.53 Federal prudential banking regulators oversee the repo activities of banks, 
while state insurance commissioners supervise repo transactions by insurance firms. 
Jurisdiction over securities lending is similarly fragmented along entity and sectoral lines, with 
the SEC, Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, Department of Labor, and state insurance 
commissioners all playing prominent roles.54  
 
This decentralized oversight creates thorny problems for implementing activities-based 
oversight of repo and securities lending. Just monitoring these markets for systemic risk is 
                                           
 
50 FSOC, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2012), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
51 See VIKTORIA BAKLANOVA ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., REFERENCE GUIDE TO U.S. REPO AND 
SECURITIES LENDING MARKETS 15–16, 22 (rev. ed. Dec. 2015), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr740.pdf; see also FSOC 2017 ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 32, at 52. 
52 See BAKLANOVA ET AL., supra note 51, at 17, 29. 
53 See Paolo Saguato, The Liquidity Dilemma and the Repo Market:  A Two-Step Policy Option to Address the 
Regulatory Void, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85, 94–95 (2017). 
54 See, e.g., BAKLANOVA ET AL., supra note 51, at 31, 34–35, 54-56. 
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difficult because the reporting requirements differ by sector.55 Any activities-based approach to 
regulating short-term securities financing—such as limits on the aggregate amount of this 
activity at any firm or requirements that they be paired with liquid assets—would inevitably 
result in inconsistent implementation and an unlevel competitive playing field that would 
present opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.56 Although an activities-based approach might 
theoretically be able to resolve this problem, there is no way to implement such an approach 
consistently given the current fragmentation of regulatory authority in this domain. Meanwhile, 
coordination problems would thwart a crisis response if a securities dealer defaulted on its repo 
loans because no single regulator would have the authority to oversee an orderly sale of the 
collateral in its creditors’ hands, increasing the chances of a run.57 In sum, this web of 
competing rules and agency fiefdoms, arbitrage incentives, and coordination problems would 
make a uniform set of activities-based rules for systemic risk nearly impossible in the repo and 
securities lending space. 
 
e. Cybersecurity  
 
Cybersecurity is another potentially systemic threat where jurisdictional fragmentation would 
undermine an activities-based approach. As FSOC has noted, a cyberattack or outage could 
disrupt market trading, paralyze the operations of a key financial hub, interrupt clearing and 
settlement, and shatter customers’ confidence in the financial system.58 This system-wide risk 
demands an overarching approach that focuses on the larger structure of financial markets and 
the weak links within them. U.S. regulation of financial market cybersecurity falls woefully 
short of this goal.  
 
In the financial arena, cyber regulation is siloed among various state and federal regulators. At 
the federal level, nine financial regulators and the Treasury Department have direct jurisdiction 
over cybersecurity at financial firms.59 State banking, insurance, and securities regulators have 
concurrent authority over state-chartered financial companies.60 Adding to this, the Department 
of Homeland Security has lead responsibility for the federal response to cyber threats, while 
other federal agencies and departments, including the Federal Communications Commission 
                                           
 
55 See id. at 46–60. 
56 See Benjamin Munyan, Regulatory Arbitrage in Repo Markets 1–7, 11–12 (OFR, Working Paper No. 15-
22, 2015), https://www.financialresearch.gov/working-papers/files/OFRwp-2015-22_Repo-Arbitrage.pdf.  
57
 See FSOC, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 115 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-
reports/Documents/2015%20FSOC%20Annual%20Report.pdf;  FSOC 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 
12, 124. 
58 FSOC 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 127–28; Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9030 n.13. 
59 See Cybersecurity Regulation Harmonization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t 
Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Christopher F. Feeney, Pres., BITS/Fin. Svcs. Roundtable) [hereinafter 
Feeney Testimony]; OFR, Cybersecurity and Financial Stability: Risks and Resilience, OFR VIEWPOINT 17-01, 7–
10 (2017) [hereinafter OFR VIEWPOINT]. 
60 Feeney Testimony, supra note 59; see, e.g., Cybersecurity,  NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS: CENTER 
INS. POL’Y & RES., https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_cyber_ 
risk.htm (last updated July 11, 2018). 
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and the Department of Justice, oversee other discrete aspects of cybersecurity.61 
 
This cybersecurity tower of Babel seriously impedes a system-wide approach to cyber threats 
against financial firms. There is no single financial regulator with sight lines into the IT 
infrastructure of the entire financial sector or umbrella jurisdiction to address the sectoral 
threat. Alarmingly, cooperation among federal regulators has mostly been limited to “sharing 
information about cybersecurity threats.”62 OFR has warned that current “[r]egulatory 
boundaries may limit regulators’ perspectives on key parts of financial networks” and that 
“[p]otential blind spots include third-party vendors, overseas counterparties, and cross-border 
service providers.”63 To exacerbate matters, the welter of regulators has resulted in a 
proliferation of cybersecurity rules, guidelines, and frameworks that are marred by 
inconsistency and complexity.64   
 
In light of system-wide risks, an activities-based approach to cybersecurity would make 
eminent sense. Currently, however, the jumble of overlapping jurisdictional lines makes a 
unified approach to activities-based regulation of cyber risk for systemic risk impossible.  
 
*** 
 
Jurisdictional complexities in the U.S. regulatory framework thus render an activities-based 
approach to systemic risk unworkable. Even if FSOC were to recommend activities-based 
regulation for systemically important activities, the primary financial regulators would be 
unlikely to enact uniform, effective rules because of gaps and fragmentation in the regulatory 
structure. Remarkably, not one of the potentially systemic activities discussed in this section 
has an umbrella federal regulator that can oversee conduct across the entire financial sector. In 
some cases, like insurance activities, hedge funds, and fintech, federal regulators lack authority 
to impose systemic risk constraints. In other cases, like mortgages, derivatives, securities, 
short-term financing, and cybersecurity, federal regulation is divided among multiple agencies, 
all with different rules and approaches. These are just a few examples of potential weaknesses 
in the U.S. regulatory framework, and additional jurisdictional problems are certain to arise in 
the future. It is therefore unrealistic to imagine that regulators could implement uniform 
activities-based rules to curb risk for systemically important financial activities, absent 
significant reforms to the U.S. regulatory framework. 
  
                                           
 
61 Feeney Testimony, supra note 59. 
62 OFR, 2016 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 47 (2016), https://www.financialresearch.gov/financial-stability-
reports/files/OFR_2016_Financial-Stability-Report.pdf. 
63 OFR VIEWPOINT, supra note 59, at 10. 
64 See Feeney Testimony, supra note 59. 
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C.  Staff And Budget Cuts At OFR Hamper FSOC’s Ability To Monitor The Financial 
System For Activities Posing Systemic Risk 
 
In the preamble to the proposed guidance, FSOC states that “[a]s part of its activities-based 
approach, the Council will examine a diverse range of financial products, activities, and 
practices that could pose risks to financial stability.”65  Without this type of monitoring and 
risk assessment, no activities-based approach can be effective.  Yet FSOC, in its proposal, is 
silent about its diminishing capacity to conduct robust monitoring and risk assessment. 
 
Congress mandated OFR’s creation to provide FSOC with a centralized research arm having 
specialized expertise in systemic risk.  OFR has always been small relative to its statutory 
charge to detect and gauge systemic risk.  But between fiscal year 2017 and the first month of 
fiscal year 2019, OFR’s leadership cut the Office’s workforce from 210 employees to about 
112, a staff reduction of 46%. In fiscal year 2018, OFR’s budget was slashed by 18%.66  
These cuts to an already small agency make it substantially harder for FSOC to deliver on its 
promise to monitor activities for potential systemic risk. 
 
Strikingly, FSOC says little about OFR’s monitoring role in the proposed guidance.  Instead, 
FSOC contemplates that the “staffs of Council members and member agencies will likely be 
responsible for much of the market monitoring, risk identification, information sharing, and 
analysis in the activities-based approach.”67   
 
However, there is still no clear division of duties for monitoring systemic risk.  In 2012, GAO 
made a formal recommendation that FSOC and OFR clarify the “responsibility for 
implementing statutory requirements for monitoring and reporting on threats to U.S. financial 
stability, including the responsibilities of member agencies.”68  Just last month—fully seven 
years later—GAO reported that FSOC and OFR have yet to work out the division of 
responsibility among OFR and the federal financial regulators for monitoring threats to 
financial stability.69  Part of the problem appears to be the reluctance of front-line federal 
financial regulators to fully share data with OFR or with all of FSOC’s staff members.70 In 
view of that, FSOC’s expectation that it “will regularly rely on data, research, and analysis 
from Council member agencies” to monitor markets may be a pipe dream.71 
 
                                           
 
65 Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,030. 
66 See OFR, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2018, at 54-55 (2018) (computations by authors). 
67 Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,031. 
68 GAO, GAO-12-886, FINANCIAL STABILITY:  NEW COUNCIL AND RESEARCH OFFICE SHOULD STRENGTHEN 
THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OF THEIR DECISIONS 52 (2012). 
69 GAO, GAO-19-325SP, PRIORITY OPEN RECOMMENDATIONS:  DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 2 (April 3, 
2019). 
70 See GAO, GAO-16-175, FINANCIAL REGULATION:  COMPLEX AND FRAGMENTED STRUCTURE COULD BE 
STREAMLINED TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS 71-75 (2016). 
71 Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,040. 
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Finally, FSOC’s proposal to scrap the current stage 1 in the nonbank designation process 
would shut down an important, real-time source of information about potentially systemic 
activities at large nonbanks.  In the current stage 1, FSOC applies "a set of uniform 
quantitative metrics . . . to a broad group of" nonbanks.72  The Council’s current proposal fails 
to address the potential consequence of losing that vital source of information about 
systemically important activities by major nonbank financial providers.73   
 
II. EFFECTIVE SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION REQUIRES A ROBUST ENTITY-BASED 
APPROACH 
 
The proposed guidance not only indicates that FSOC will prioritize an ineffectual activities-
based approach to nonbank systemic risk, it also suggests that FSOC will substantially de-
emphasize entity-specific designations of individual nonbank financial companies under section 
113 of the Dodd-Frank Act. This approach, which FSOC has already largely embraced 
through its de-designation of previously designated firms and its failure to designate any new 
nonbanks as systemically important, is a significant mistake. That is because, in contrast to the 
activities-based approach the proposed guidance relies on, an entity-based approach can be 
reasonably well designed to limit the risk that firms will experience systemic insolvencies.  
 
A. Preventing Systemic Insolvencies Requires An Entity-Based Approach To Regulating 
And Supervising Potentially Systemic Nonbanks 
 
The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated unequivocally that the collapse of large, interconnected 
nonbank financial firms can threaten the global economy.  The failure or near failure of 
numerous nonbank financial firms—including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG—left 
no doubt about such firms’ systemic importance. When housing prices across the country 
declined, these nonbanks were among the first to fail, triggering the broader panic and 
necessitating massive government bailouts.  The financial crisis, in sum, demonstrated that the 
collapse of nonbank financial firms can pose the very same types of systemic risk that were 
once thought to be exclusive to banking. 
 
Entity-based regulation and supervision is necessary to prevent similar systemic insolvencies in 
the future.  First, and most importantly, entity-based regulation is essential because it 
inherently focuses on the cumulative impact of a firm’s activities across the entire financial 
conglomerate, as well as interactions between its assets and liabilities. For instance, 
consolidated risk-based capital requirements and leverage limits ensure that SIFIs maintain 
sufficient capital cushions to absorb potential losses. Liquidity rules require a SIFI to hold a 
minimum amount of liquid assets to protect against runs and reduce the likelihood that it will 
have to sell illiquid assets in a fire sale. Stress tests simulate adverse economic conditions to 
                                           
 
72 Id. at 9,030. 
73 For additional arguments against eliminating stage 1 of the current designation process, see infra, Section 
III.A.3. 
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ensure that SIFIs could withstand a severe downturn. Corporate governance reforms focus on 
improving enterprise risk management across SIFIs’ operations. Finally, supervision of 
nonbank SIFIs by the Federal Reserve is inherently focused on the prospect that a firm’s 
cumulative risk profile could result in a systemic insolvency.74  
 
This type of consolidated, entity-centric approach is essential to preventing the excessive 
accumulation of systemic risk outside of the banking sector because the risk that a firm will 
experience a systemic failure is inherently a product of the interrelations among its various 
activities. Individual activities may pose limited systemic risk in isolation, but much greater 
systemic risk when combined at an individual firm.  
 
Consider, for instance, a firm’s susceptibility to a “run,” which is perhaps the single most 
important characteristic of systemically important financial firms. To be vulnerable to a run, a 
firm normally must fund itself with some form of short-term liabilities payable in cash. Yet 
there are nearly infinite ways to structure short-term borrowing arrangements. Examples 
include repo transactions, securities lending, warehouse lines of credit and commercial paper. 
Firms that pair such short-term liabilities with long-term illiquid assets are vulnerable to run-
like dynamics because they may be required to dump their illiquid assets at fire-sale prices in 
order to raise enough cash to meet creditor demands. Knowing this, creditors may rush to 
claim repayment before the firm’s cash reserves run out, in a classic case of the prisoner’s 
dilemma. Creditors’ uncertainty about the firm’s true financial health often exacerbates this 
stampede. 
 
Not only are there innumerable potential types of short-term borrowing, but short-term 
borrowing is not the only type of liability that can generate a run. For instance, the crisis 
illustrated that run risk can also arise from any transaction that potentially requires a firm to 
post increasing amounts of cash collateral. AIG’s CDSs are the poster child for this type of 
cash-collateral driven run.75 These derivatives allowed counterparties to insist on increasing 
amounts of cash collateral to back the firm’s insurance-like promises as either the firm’s credit 
rating declined or the mortgage-backed securities they referenced decreased in value. The 
redeemable equity issued by MMMFs is yet another type of liability that generated runs in the 
crisis but that was not short-term borrowing. Instead, it constituted equity that investors could 
redeem on demand, at the fund’s net asset value, causing investors to run from these funds by 
seeking to withdraw their funds en masse once one large MMMF “broke the buck,” disclosing 
that the value of its assets had fallen below the one dollar threshold.  
 
  
                                           
 
74 See Governor Daniel K. Tarullo, Speech on Insurance Companies and the Role of the Federal Reserve 
(May 20, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20160520a.pdf. Additionally, the 
Federal Reserve’s uniquely prominent role in financial regulation means that it often has the capability to observe 
both sides of a nonbank SIFI’s counterparty transactions. 
75 See Schwarcz, supra note 25, at 553–54.  A CDS insures against the risk that securities referenced in the 
agreement will fare poorly.  See id. 
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So far, this litany of activities that create run risk consists of examples that precipitated runs 
during the crisis. But innumerable potential activities that were not prominent during the crisis 
could also create run risk. For instance, many life insurers sell products that provide 
policyholders with an immediate right to withdraw their investment or borrow against their 
policy value. Other examples include guaranteed investment contracts, funding agreements, 
and certain variable annuity contracts.76 As insurers’ product designs change in the future, still 
other innovations could trigger a run.77 
  
The fact that numerous known and unknown activities can create run risk highlights the 
importance of entity-based regulation because an individual firm’s exposure to a run ultimately 
depends on its aggregate reliance on all activities that create run risk.  The inherently 
cumulative nature of run risk follows from the fact that all of a firm’s potential sources of run 
risk are likely to be triggered when it faces acute financial distress. This point is nicely 
illustrated by the collapse of AIG. As AIG’s precarious financial position became clear 
throughout 2008, its CDS counterparties insisted that it post cash collateral on its derivatives at 
the same time that its securities lending counterparties terminated their transactions.78 It was 
hardly fortuitous that this run on AIG implicated two different activities operated out of 
different subsidiaries; as AIG’s counterparties realized the extent of the firm’s troubles, they 
ran however they could to avoid experiencing losses if AIG defaulted.  
 
A firm’s susceptibility to a run further depends on yet another entity-centric concept: the 
interactions between its liabilities and assets. For instance, a seemingly reasonable amount of 
short-term debt might create dangerous run risk for a firm that over-invests in highly illiquid 
assets. As such, even a single activity that creates potential short-term liabilities may have a 
very different valance when it is combined with other activities that are not ordinarily 
considered systemic in isolation. An entity-based approach can respond to such interactions 
because it is focused on both the asset and liability sides of firms’ balance sheets.79 
 
We focus on the inherently cumulative nature of run risk here both because runs are one of the 
central ways that an entity can become systemically risky and because an activities-based 
approach does indeed have some potential strengths in addressing this risk.  But various 
additional criteria are, of course, relevant to the prospect that an individual firm will prove 
                                           
 
76 See Robert McMenamin et al., How Liquid Are U.S. Life Insurance Liabilities?, CHI. FED. LETTER, Sept. 
2012, http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/Chicago-fed-letter/2012/September-302.  
77 See Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1569, 1619-23 (2014). 
78 See Schwarcz, supra note 25, at 554. 
79 In connection with the activities-based approach, FSOC states that it would consider whether the 
combination of characteristics such as asset valuation risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, and lack of transparency in 
discrete products, activities, or practices “warrants further scrutiny.”  Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,030-
31.  This is no assurance, however, that the Council will consider interaction effects among products, activities, 
or practices.  In view of the infinite number of unique configurations of combined activities and practices 
observable among complex individual firms, the activities-based approach is no substitute for the entity-based 
approach. 
22 
 
 
systemically significant in a crisis.  These include a firm’s size, connections to other major 
financial institutions, and preexisting regulatory scrutiny, especially at the enterprise level.80  
And like run risk, all of these additional indicia of systemic significance can only be 
meaningfully policed by an entity-based approach.  A firm’s interconnectedness, for instance, 
necessarily depends on the cumulative impact of its activities. Innumerable financial 
activities—ranging from ordinary borrowing, to securities management, to derivatives, to the 
issuance of insurance policies—expose a nonbank firm’s counterparties to the risk that the firm 
might fail. 
 
On its own, an activities-based approach fails to address the risk that a combination of 
activities—none of which creates excessive short-term liabilities individually—might generate 
excessive run risk in the aggregate. Activities-based regulation generally seeks to limit the 
risks of an activity that creates short-term liabilities by, for instance, requiring that firms 
engaging in the activity maintain specified levels of liquid assets or creating mechanisms by 
which counterparties’ capacity to run is suspended.81 In doing so, activities-based regulation 
sets these safeguards only by reference to the prospect that the underlying activity, considered 
in isolation, might generate a run. In the absence of a complementary entity-based regime, 
however, activities-based regulation cannot calibrate customized safeguards for an individual 
firm’s cumulative activities, in the aggregate. 
 
B. Only An Entity-Based Approach Can Deter Nonbank Firms From Seeking Out Systemic 
Risk 
 
Second, entity-based nonbank SIFI regulation can also prevent systemic insolvencies indirectly, 
by causing designated firms to shed risk in an effort to jettison their SIFI designations. The 
2008 financial crisis demonstrated not only that nonbanks can be systemically risky, but that 
they have good reason to affirmatively seek out systemic risk so as to increase the likelihood 
that they will be bailed out in the midst of a crisis. This, in turn, can decrease the costs to such 
a firm of funding its operations, as creditors accept lower rates of return in exchange for a 
perceived implicit government guarantee that the debtor firm will not be allowed to fail in a 
subset of situations.  
 
The entity-based approach helps to counteract this incentive by imposing various extra 
regulatory restrictions and costs on firms that are designated as systemic.82 This, in turn, 
incentivizes nonbanks that are designated as SIFIs to limit activities that may create the 
prospect of a systemic failure. This reality has been vividly demonstrated with respect to firms 
                                           
 
80 In this regard, we are concerned by FSOC’s statement that the Council “may consider the company and its 
subsidiaries together, to enable the Council to consider the potential risks arising across the consolidated 
organizations.”  Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,036 (emphasis added).  This ignores the critical 
importance of assessing risks throughout the enterprise.  FSOC should instead make enterprise risk assessment the 
default position. 
81 The SEC’s reforms of MMMFs provide examples of these strategies.  See supra notes 11–13. 
82 Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 14, at 1835–38. 
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that have been designated as SIFIs by FSOC: GE Capital and AIG both restructured their 
businesses in successful bids to shed their status as nonbank SIFIs. Even MetLife, which 
embraced a successful legal and political strategy to escape its status as a nonbank SIFI, 
simultaneously reduced its participation in certain potentially systemic activities.  
 
Not only does an entity-based approach incentivize systemically significant nonbanks to de-
risk, it also discourages nonbanks from seeking out systemic risk in the first place. This is 
because the mere prospect of being designated as a SIFI—and thus facing increased regulatory 
restrictions and compliance burdens—creates real risks and uncertainties for firms, which they 
will seek to avoid.   In this way, entity-based approaches help counteract the moral hazard that 
persists as a result of the 2008 bailouts of nonbank firms. 
 
By contrast, an activities-based approach in isolation affirmatively incentivizes nonbanks to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage by seeking out activities that have not been identified or 
appropriately regulated. Doing so offers all the ordinary potential benefits to firms of systemic 
risk—the ability to reap the upside reward of risk, while externalizing some of the downside—
but only limited downside. This is because the firm does not bear the full costs of engaging in 
such an activity until it is regulated appropriately. Financial firms are accustomed to adjusting 
as the regulatory landscape changes, and they can choose either to cease engaging in a newly 
identified systemic activity or to conform to the new regulatory standards. And unlike in an 
entity-based regime, either choice can be implemented immediately because they do not usually 
require affirmative approval by regulators.     
 
C. An Entity-Based Approach Is Relatively Easy To Implement Effectively   
 
Third, identifying systemically significant nonbank firms is much more manageable than 
correctly identifying all systemically significant activities ex ante. As discussed above, it is 
extremely difficult for regulators to anticipate new and emerging systemic activities. That 
explains why, in contrast to assertions by several FSOC members, the Council’s proposed 
activities based approach does not “back test” well. The experience of the President’s Working 
Group on Financial Markets (PWG), in fact, demonstrates that a primarily activities-based 
approach failed to prevent the 2008 financial crisis. The PWG was essentially a precursor to 
FSOC, with a mandate to address systemically risky activities. While the financial sector 
amassed mortgage-related risks during the mid-2000s, however, PWG focused on issues 
entirely unconnected to the looming crisis.  It was not until March 2008 that PWG finally 
recommended improved standards for mortgage origination, securitizations, and derivatives—
the week before Bear Stearns failed. 83  PWG’s experience during the mid-2000s underscores 
that regulators face serious challenges in identifying the specific activities that will transmit 
systemic risks.  
 
                                           
 
83
 See THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL 
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-
mkts/Documents/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf. 
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Relative to these difficulties, FSOC is much more likely to be able to consistently and 
accurately identify nonbank SIFIs. Although the distinction between firms that are systemically 
significant and those that are not can be blurry, it is generally straightforward to identify which 
firms are plausibly close to the line and which are clearly on one side or the other.84 Moreover, 
both U.S. and international actors have developed detailed frameworks for identifying 
systemically significant firms, which have produced similar results as alternative 
methodologies.85  
 
Perhaps even more importantly, FSOC need not perfectly distinguish between nonbanks that 
are systemically significant and those which are not to deter nonbanks from seeking out 
systemic risk. To the contrary, so long as the designation process is even roughly accurate, 
nonbank firms will have strong incentives to avoid pursuing strategies that could result in their 
failure propagating systemic risk.  
 
Implementing an entity-based designation regime in settings where a nonbank firm’s baseline 
sectoral regime is not oriented to systemic risk concerns is relatively straightforward. This is 
because the entity-based approach layers enhanced macroprudential regulation on top of an 
entity’s baseline regulatory regime. Although this creates some coordination challenges 
between the Federal Reserve and a firm’s baseline regulator, these challenges are generally 
manageable and have improved gradually as the Federal Reserve has developed working 
relationships with designated firms’ sectoral regulators, particularly state insurance 
regulators.86 
 
Finally, there is nothing unusual about an entity-based approach to financial regulation.  To the 
contrary, the entity-based approach mirrors traditional financial regulation, which attaches 
different regulatory regimes to different types of financial firms, with investment banks subject 
to one set of regulatory restrictions, insurers a second set, and commercial banks a third. 
FSOC’s entity-based approach departs from this tradition because its enhanced regulation 
applies to all nonbank SIFIs, regardless of their charter types. But aside from this design 
feature, FSOC’s entity-based approach fits comfortably within traditional entity-based schemes 
of financial regulation, while addressing systemic risk. 
 
                                           
 
84 See FSOC, Guidance for Nonbank Financial Company Determinations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310, app. A, § II 
(2018) [hereinafter 2012 Guidance]. 
85 See Acharya et al., Measuring Systemic Risk, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2, 39 (identifying Bear Stearns, Lehman 
Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch among the top 10 systemically risky financial 
firms in 2006–07 in back-testing of authors’ marginal expected shortfall approach to systemic risk); Christian 
Brownlees & Robert F. Engle, SRISK: A Conditional Capital Shortfall Measure of Systemic Risk, 30 REV. FIN. 
STUDS. 48, 62–63 (2017) (finding that back-testing of authors’ SRISK metric identified Morgan Stanley, Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac as top systemic risk contributors as early as the 
beginning of 2005).   
86 See Insurance Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Ins. of the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 115th Cong. (2016) (testimony of Thomas Sullivan, Associate Director, Division of Banking Supervision 
and Regulation).  
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D. An Entity-Based Approach Can Increase The Effectiveness Of An Activities-Based 
Approach   
 
Fourth, an entity-based approach to financial stability can also complement activities-based 
regulation by helping regulators to identify potentially systemic activities ex ante, and by 
allowing them to assess how well activities-based reforms are curbing risk.  An entity-based 
approach produces these benefits through regular on- and off-site supervision of nonbank 
SIFIs. Continuous monitoring—a hallmark of entity-based systemic risk oversight—allows 
officials to observe the impact of different activities across time.87 This unique vantage point 
allows them to more quickly identify troubling activities. For instance, if supervisors observe 
that several nonbank SIFIs are suddenly engaging in a new activity at accelerating rates, this is 
likely to trigger enhanced scrutiny of the activity itself, in a way that might otherwise be 
overlooked. Likewise, firm-wide examinations and continuous off-site monitoring can help 
supervisors detect when nonbank SIFIs respond to activities-based rules by changing their 
business models to continue taking systemic risks. In this way, regular entity-based nonbank 
SIFI supervision can help overcome some of the limitations inherent in an activities-based 
approach. 
 
E. An Entity-Based Approach Can Limit The Consequences Of A Systemic Nonbank 
Failure   
 
Fifth, entity-based regulation not only reduces the likelihood that a systemically important 
nonbank will fail, it also limits the macroeconomic consequences if such a firm were to 
experience distress. Dodd-Frank established the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) to 
resolve financial firms that prove systemically important while limiting the harm to the broader 
economy. The OLA is unlikely to succeed, however, without ex ante entity-based nonbank 
regulation. This is because only designated nonbanks are required to prepare in advance for the 
firm’s OLA resolution by developing an annual resolution plan, or “living will,” explaining 
how the firm could be wound down.88 A nonbank SIFI’s living will provides regulators crucial 
insight into the firm’s legal entity structure, its key operations, and management information 
systems that allows the FDIC to plan, in advance, if it must resolve the firm through OLA. 
Moreover, if the FDIC or Federal Reserve concludes that the nonbank SIFI is too complex to 
be resolved in an orderly fashion, the agencies may object to its living will and compel the 
firm to simplify its organizational structure. Thus, ex ante entity-based regulation enhances the 
likelihood that a systemically important nonbank can be resolved with minimal systemic 
externalities. 
 
Ex ante entity-based regulation also helps ensure that nonbank SIFIs hold sufficient financial 
resources to facilitate their orderly resolution. In an OLA proceeding, the FDIC would convert 
                                           
 
87 See BD. GOVS. FED. RES. SYS., SR 12-17, CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION FRAMEWORK FOR LARGE 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 9–10 (2012) (discussing Federal Reserve supervision of nonbank SIFIs). 
88 See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(1) (2012).  Bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $250 billion 
or more must also prepare living wills.  Id. 
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the original holding company’s long-term creditors into equity holders in a new bridge 
company. This recapitalization allows the holding company’s subsidiaries—for instance, its 
commercial bank, broker-dealer, or insurance companies—to continue operating. If, however, 
the holding company does not have sufficient long-term debt to recapitalize the bridge 
company, then the firm’s subsidiaries will be shut down and resolved under applicable 
insolvency laws—the precise outcome that the OLA seeks to avoid. Under Dodd-Frank, the 
Federal Reserve may require a designated nonbank SIFI to issue minimum amounts of long-
term debt to enhance its resolvability.89 Without ex ante entity-based regulation, however, a 
systemically important nonbank is unlikely to hold the financial resources necessary for an 
orderly resolution. 
 
Additionally, ex ante entity-based oversight gives the Federal Reserve advance warning of an 
impending failure through the supervision process and fuller information about counterparties’ 
exposure to the firm. This would help prevent a repeat of the situation with Bear Stearns and 
AIG in 2008, where the Federal Reserve had to fly blind when both companies approached it 
for emergency bailouts because it was neither company’s supervisor.  In today’s framework, ex 
ante supervision would help policymakers assess whether such a firm should be placed into 
OLA. 
 
*** 
 
In sum, entity-based systemic risk regulation is uniquely capable of preventing catastrophic 
nonbank failures. This is because the content of entity-based regulation—such as capital, 
liquidity, and risk-management requirements—is inherently focused on the cumulative impact 
of a firm’s activities. Moreover, an entity-based approach is a more effective deterrent against 
firms taking on systemic risk than an activities-based approach, as firms can quickly adjust to 
new activities-based rules through regulatory arbitrage. An entity-based approach is also 
inherently more reliable than the alternative, as identifying systemically significant firms is 
substantially easier than identifying systemically significant activities ex ante. Entity-based 
nonbank SIFI designations are therefore critical to prevent a recurrence of the systemic 
nonbank insolvencies from 2008.  Accordingly, the Council should decline to adopt the 
proposed guidance, which would misguidedly put nonbank SIFI designations on the back 
burner. 
 
III. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE DESIGNATION PROCESS UNDERMINE FSOC’S ABILITY 
TO DESIGNATE NONBANK SIFIS 
 
The Council insists that its activities-based approach would merely supplement, rather than 
displace, nonbank SIFI designations.  But the Council’s proposed changes to its designation 
                                           
 
89 See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1)(B)(iv) (authorizing Federal Reserve to establish prudential standards as it 
deems appropriate for nonbank SIFIs).  The Federal Reserve has mandated that global systemically important 
banks hold minimum amounts of unsecured long-term debt and other loss-absorbing instruments.  See 12 C.F.R. 
§ 252.62 (2017).  The Federal Reserve has not yet proposed comparable standards for nonbank SIFIs. 
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process belie this contention.  In practice, the proposed new procedures would make it nearly 
impossible for the Council to designate new nonbank SIFIs and for any such designation to 
survive judicial review.  Moreover, the Council’s proposal to prioritize an activities-based 
approach and resort to nonbank SIFI designations only in an emergency fundamentally 
misconstrues the purpose of nonbank SIFI designations and the need for entity-based 
regulation. 
  
A. Proposed Procedural Changes Would Render Nonbank SIFI Designations Impracticable 
 
The Council’s proposed guidance would make several ill-advised changes to the SIFI 
designation process.  First, the proposal would require the Council to assess the likelihood of a 
potential designee’s material financial distress.  Second, the guidance would subject any future 
SIFI designation to mandatory cost-benefit analysis and other quantitative assessments.  Third, 
the Council would eliminate Stage 1 of the current designation process, wherein the Council 
applies quantitative thresholds to identify nonbank financial companies for closer evaluation.  
For the reasons explained below, each of these changes, if enacted, would substantially 
undermine FSOC’s ability to designate nonbank SIFIs and thereby increase systemic risk. 
 
Several of these proposed procedural changes find their origins in the district court opinion in 
MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council.90  The Council has requested comment 
on whether it should interpret its SIFI designation authority in a manner that is consistent with 
the MetLife opinion.91  We strongly urge the Council not to do so.  As a district court opinion, 
the MetLife ruling holds limited precedential value and in no way binds FSOC in the future.92  
Even the MetLife court itself acknowledged that its opinion was limited to the unique facts of 
that case.93  Moreover, the court’s legal reasoning was fatally flawed for all of the reasons the 
Council cited in its appeal before abruptly reversing its position after the 2016 presidential 
election.94  Accordingly, the MetLife district court decision should not influence the Council’s 
future use of its SIFI designation authority. 
 
1. Likelihood Of Material Financial Distress 
 
The proposed guidance states that the Council will consider the likelihood of a company’s 
material financial distress when evaluating the firm for potential designation.95  The Council 
should reconsider this procedural change for two reasons.  First, the proposal is impermissible 
                                           
 
90 177 F. Supp.3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016). 
91 See Question 26 of the Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,035. 
92 See, e.g., Camretta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011). 
93 See MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council, No. 15-0045 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2018) (order 
denying Joint Motion to Vacate in Part March 30, 2016 Order and Opinion)  (“This Court is one of 94 United 
States District Courts, comprising several hundred judges, and its Opinion is not binding on others.  The Opinion 
stands on its own persuasive value, to the extent it has any.”). 
94 Brief for Appellant, MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council, No. 16-5086 (D. C. Cir. June 
16, 2016). 
95 Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,044-45. 
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under the Council’s authorizing legislation.  Second, even if permissible under the statute, the 
proposal would undermine FSOC’s ability to prevent a systemically-significant failure through 
designation. 
 
As a threshold matter, the Council’s proposal to consider a company’s likelihood of material 
financial distress conflicts with the text of the Dodd-Frank Act.  The statute instructs FSOC to 
assume that a firm is in distress and analyze whether that distress could pose a threat to U.S. 
financial stability.96  Dodd-Frank unambiguously directs the Council to assess the potential 
consequences of a company’s material financial distress, not the likelihood that it would 
experience such distress in the first place.  Thus, in answer to question 29 of the proposed 
guidance, the Council must observe the express language of section 113. 
 
Congress had good reason for instructing FSOC to conduct its designation analysis by 
assuming financial distress at a company.  It wanted FSOC to take a precautionary approach by 
considering designation where a nonbank financial firm could—not would—threaten U.S. 
financial stability. This safeguard is eminently sensible, because the FSOC designation process 
is inherently lengthy.  As FSOC’s prior experience demonstrates, it can take years for the 
Council to evaluate a nonbank for potential designation, for the Federal Reserve to establish 
regulations appropriately tailored to a nonbank SIFI’s business model, and for a designated 
nonbank SIFI to bring itself into compliance with those safeguards.  Thus, waiting to designate 
a nonbank until it is vulnerable to distress in all likelihood would be too late.  By the time the 
relevant capital, liquidity, and other safeguards associated with designation went into effect, 
the nonbank SIFI may already have collapsed. 
 
Moreover, conditioning a firm’s designation on its vulnerability to distress could actually 
hasten its collapse.  The Proposed Guidance would redefine the term “material financial 
distress” to mean “imminent danger of insolvency or [of] defaulting on [the firm’s] financial 
obligations.”97  Any SIFI designation issued under this standard would signal that the Council 
views the company as in imminent risk of failure, potentially triggering a run and creating the 
very instability that SIFI designations are designed to prevent.  Accordingly, assessing a 
company’s likelihood of distress would not only undermine FSOC’s ability to prevent a 
systemically-significant failure through designation, it might perversely contribute to such a 
collapse. 
 
                                           
 
96
 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (“The Council … may determine that a U.S. nonbank financial company shall be 
supervised by the Board … if the Council determines that material financial distress at the U.S. nonbank financial 
company … could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.”) (emphasis added).  FSOC proposes 
restricting the meaning of the term “threat to the financial stability of the United States” to mean the potential for 
“severe damage on the broader economy,” rather than “significant” damage, as the 2012 Guidance states.  Proposed 
Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,032 (emphasis added).  The Council does not justify any need for that change.  
Recharacterizing the standard in this way could raise the evidentiary burden for future SIFI designations and thereby 
restrict FSOC’s ability to designate nonbank firms. 
97 Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,034. 
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 2. Cost-Benefit And Other Quantitative Analyses 
 
The proposed guidance would also require the Council to perform a series of quantitative 
assessments as part of any future designation.  Most significantly, the proposal would require 
the Council to conduct a quantitative cost-benefit analysis and proceed with a designation only 
if the expected benefits outweigh the costs.  Moreover, the Council’s inquiry about adopting 
the MetLife precedent suggests that FSOC might insist on various statistical analyses designed 
to illustrate how a firm’s distress would reverberate throughout the U.S. financial system.98  If 
FSOC were to interpret its section 113 authority in a manner consistent with the MetLife 
opinion, the Council would effectively require statistical estimates of the systemic 
consequences of a firm’s material financial distress as a condition of its SIFI designation.99 
 
The Council should refrain from codifying these mandatory quantitative assessments.  
Quantifying the costs and benefits of nonbank SIFI designations and empirically estimating the 
effects of a firm’s financial distress poses serious analytical challenges.  Any such empirical 
analyses would be susceptible to ex post second-guessing by a reviewing court, thereby 
creating litigation risk for the Council and potentially deterring it from even attempting to use 
its SIFI designation authority.  
 
It is extraordinarily difficult for the Council to assess the costs and benefits of nonbank SIFI 
designations with any degree of reliability. The stability-enhancing benefits of financial 
regulations are notoriously difficult to calculate accurately. As many scholars have recognized, 
quantifying the benefit of a crisis averted is nearly impossible.100 Because of the infrequency of 
financial crises, moreover, financial regulatory cost-benefit analyses are highly sensitive to 
crude economic loss and discount rate assumptions.101 Unpredictable financial market 
dynamics, including future regulation and adaptation by financial firms, further complicate any 
attempt to quantify the effects of designating any particular nonbank as systemic.102  
 
For these reasons, quantitative cost-benefit analysis is susceptible to ex post second-guessing by 
a reviewing court.103 Indeed, courts have increasingly overturned agencies’ rules “on the 
                                           
 
98 See Question 26 of the Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,035. 
99 177 F. Supp.3d 219, 233-39 (D.D.C. 2016).  Because FSOC used the word “likelihood” in the 2012 
Guidance, the court required it to statistically estimate the losses to MetLife’s counterparties if MetLife 
experienced financial distress, “based on reasoned predictions.”  Id. at 237.  The court insisted that “a summary 
of exposures and assets is not a prediction.”  Id.  Effectively, the court insisted that FSOC use multivariate 
regression analysis, not descriptive statistics, to analyze how a firm’s distress could impact the broader financial 
system.  To also foreclose this problem going forward, we urge FSOC to avoid using the word “likelihood” in its 
prospective new guidance. 
100 See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 
YALE L.J. 882, 960–69 (2015); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial 
Regulation, 43. J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S373–75 (2014). 
101 See Coates, supra note 100, at 947, 962, 972. 
102 See Gordon, supra note 100, at S373–75. 
103 See Coates, supra note 100, at 920. 
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ground that [the] court[] would conduct its guesstimated [cost-benefit analysis] differently than 
[the] agency would.”104 As a result, the uncertainty and discretion inherent in quantitative cost-
benefit analyses create litigation risk for financial regulators. Accordingly, requiring FSOC to 
perform quantitative cost-benefit analyses would hold the Council to an impossible standard 
and render future SIFI designations vulnerable to legal challenge.  With U.S. financial stability 
hanging in the balance, that legal risk must be avoided, particularly because Section 113 does 
not mandate or contemplate a cost-benefit test.  Furthermore, the prospect of FSOC having to 
conduct such a demanding cost-benefit analysis when a nonbank systemically risky firm is on 
the brink of insolvency105 conjures images of fiddling while Rome burns.106 
 
Similar to assessing the costs and benefits of nonbank SIFI designations, quantifying the 
systemic consequences of a firm’s material financial distress—as the MetLife court insists—
poses intractable analytical challenges. Calculating the statistical likelihood of a firm 
experiencing material financial distress that could trigger a chain reaction, or quantifying the 
precise pathways of such a chain reaction, would be Herculean demands. This is because 
systemic failures only occur when the broader financial system is unstable and other financial 
firms are too weak to survive losses.107 As a result, the likelihood of systemic failure cannot be 
modeled without predicting the chance that crisis conditions will arise in the larger financial 
system.  
 
It is impossible, however, to estimate statistically the likelihood, magnitude, or timing of a 
future financial crisis. Sample size is one barrier. Unless the sample is sufficiently large, 
reliable statistical inferences cannot be drawn. This problem is insurmountable when it comes 
to nonbank firms, which did not manifest systemic risk (with rare exceptions) before 2008 and 
thus are relatively new objects of systemic concern. 
  
Further complicating the statistical task, analysts would have to consider far too many potential 
explanatory variables to draw inferences with confidence. In the systemic risk context, there 
are a virtually infinite number of explanatory factors that can predict a future financial crisis or 
losses to a firm’s counterparties. Innumerable permutations of events might make financial 
companies fragile. Some of those scenarios are known from past experience, but others are as 
yet unknown and cannot be anticipated, making any forecast too conservative. Moreover, 
because the timing of crises is hard to predict, statisticians would have to compute their 
                                           
 
104 Id. at 919–20. 
105 FSOC states that it will only conduct a cost-benefit analysis after the Council has concluded that “the 
company meets one of” the two determination standards under Section 113.  Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 
9,034.  Practically speaking, this means that in virtually every case, FSOC would have already determined that 
the company was in imminent danger of failure before undertaking the cost-benefit analysis. 
106 Furthermore, the cost-benefit test is asymmetrical in that FSOC would require one to designate a SIFI, but 
would not undertake a cost-benefit analysis in order to de-designate a company. 
107 FSOC acknowledged this when it stated in the Proposed Guidance that its “analysis of the likelihood of a 
nonbank financial company’s material financial distress will be conducted taking into account a period of overall 
stress in the financial services industry and a weak macroeconomic environment.”  Proposed Guidance, supra 
note 7, at 9,035. 
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projections for multiple and often distant points in the future.  
 
The analysis could not stop there, because financial crises have a large behavioral element. 
Next, statisticians would have to predict how other market participants would react if the 
counterparties’ solvency was in doubt and the counterparties’ responses to those reactions. The 
often irrational nature of market actors’ reactions and the many assumptions that would need to 
be made would relegate any such projections to guesswork. In short, there would be far too 
many potential explanatory variables to make accurate predictions under these circumstances, 
particularly given the small sample size available.  
 
Because material financial distress (in the systemic sense) cannot occur outside of crisis 
conditions, any attempt to model statistically an individual company’s systemic distress would 
be subject to question. Further, even if a financial catastrophe could be forecast, that forecast 
would only apply to financial firms in the aggregate, not to specific firms. Nothing in that 
forecast would tell us that MetLife, for instance, would be the one to trigger that crisis instead 
of other firms. Even Treasury has conceded this point, stating: “There is no proven method for 
predicting with precision the effect that the failure of any nonbank financial company will have 
on financial stability.”108 
 
To summarize, the proposed guidance and MetLife precedent would require the impossible of 
FSOC by insisting that it statistically calculate the costs and benefits of a potential designation, 
as well as the precise pathways by which the firm’s material financial distress might spread.  
Codifying these procedural hurdles would seriously undermine the Council’s ability to 
designate nonbank SIFIs and open up any future designations to the prospect of judicial 
reversal. 
 
3. Eliminating Stage 1 Of The Current Designation Process 
 
The proposed guidance would eliminate Stage 1 of the current designation process, wherein the 
Council applies quantitative thresholds to identify nonbank financial companies that merit 
closer evaluation.  Instead of applying these established quantitative thresholds to identify 
nonbanks that might pose a systemic risk, the proposed guidance would apparently leave to the 
Council’s discretion when to begin the determination process.  The current Stage 1 quantitative 
thresholds are a valuable pre-commitment mechanism that ensures the Council reviews a broad 
range of firms that might plausibly threaten U.S. financial stability.  Eliminating the current 
Stage 1 thresholds and replacing them with unspecified, discretionary identification tools would 
therefore be unwise. 
 
  
                                           
 
108 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL DESIGNATIONS 23 (2017), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/PM-FSOC-Designations-Memo-11-17.pdf. 
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The Stage 1 thresholds, as currently implemented, ensure that the Council actively evaluates a 
nonbank’s systemic risk whenever the requisite thresholds are triggered.109  Without this pre-
commitment device, the Council might not proactively identify potentially risky nonbank 
financial companies or emerging systemically risky activities.  This fear is especially salient 
today, given the infrequency with which the Council convenes, and the perfunctory nature of 
most of its meetings.110  Absent the current Stage 1 thresholds, some nonbank financial 
companies will undoubtedly escape more detailed review that could expose potential risks.  
Accordingly, the Council should not eliminate this important screening step in the 
determination process. 
 
Doing away with the current Stage 1 screening would not only hinder the efficacy of FSOC’s 
designation process, it would also reduce the clarity and predictability of nonbank SIFI 
designations. As currently defined, the Stage 1 thresholds provide transparency about what 
factors trigger the enhanced review of a nonbank financial firm. In doing so, these thresholds 
provide nonbank financial firms an effective safe harbor for avoiding the Council’s scrutiny.  If 
firms remain below the Stage 1 thresholds, they can be relatively certain they will not be 
further analyzed for potential designation.  Getting rid of the Stage 1 thresholds, however, will 
obfuscate FSOC’s review process and reduce clarity about what triggers the Council’s 
enhanced review.  Thus, in contrast to its stated goal of increasing transparency in the 
designation process, eliminating the current Stage 1 screening mechanism would make the 
FSOC designation process more opaque. 
 
B. De-Emphasizing Nonbank SIFI Designations And Mischaracterizing Them As An 
Emergency Response Tool Will Increase Systemic Risk  
 
Finally, the Council’s proposal to prioritize an activities-based approach—and consider 
nonbank SIFI designations only as a last resort—would dramatically slow the process of 
designating a nonbank SIFI, even when conditions clearly warrant such a designation.  The 
designation process that the Council envisions would involve multiple rounds of consultation 
and coordination among the relevant regulatory agencies before the Council would potentially 
consider nonbank SIFI designations.  FSOC would build in more time to allow a Stage 1 
company to “take actions” to de-risk and avoid designation.111  This multi-step process would 
take so long in practice that by the time FSOC even considered addressing escalating risks 
through nonbank SIFI designations, it could be too late.   
 
                                           
 
109 The Council elevates a nonbank financial company to Stage 2 if it has $50 billion in total consolidated 
assets and meets at least one of the other thresholds relating to credit default swaps outstanding, derivative 
liabilities, total debt outstanding, leverage, and short-term debt.  2012 Guidance, supra note 84, 12 C.F.R. pt. 
1310, app. A.  
110 See Ryan Tracy, Risk of Bank-Like Regulation Fades for Big Financial Firms, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-regulators-rescind-federal-oversight-of-prudential-financial-1539783308 
(noting the short duration of recent FSOC meetings). 
111 Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,036. 
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The SIFI designation process is already lengthy, with extensive evaluation and ample 
opportunity for the relevant company to present evidence to the Council.  Moreover, it takes 
additional time for the Federal Reserve to develop appropriately-tailored rules for any company 
designated as a nonbank SIFI, and even more time for the company to bring itself into 
compliance with those safeguards.  Further delaying the designation process by mandating that 
the Council first exhaust all activities-based remedies is therefore highly inadvisable. 
 
The proposed guidance mistakenly views nonbank SIFI designations as an emergency response 
to be used if activities-based regulation fails to address systemic risks.  Indeed, the guidance 
would bind FSOC to considering a nonbank SIFI designation “only in rare instances such as an 
emergency situation….”112  This view gravely misconstrues the purpose of nonbank SIFI 
designations.  A nonbank SIFI designation is not an emergency tool; instead, it is a 
prophylactic strategy to protect a systemically important nonbank from experiencing distress in 
the first place.113  In order for the capital, liquidity, resolution planning, and other safeguards 
associated with nonbank SIFI designations to have their intended effect, FSOC must 
proactively use nonbank SIFI designations as an ex ante crisis-prevention strategy, not as a 
belated crisis response. 
 
It is clear that Congress did not intend FSOC’s SIFI designation authority to be an emergency 
response tool based on the fact that it established a separate mechanism to resolve failing 
financial companies.  As discussed above, Dodd-Frank created the OLA to resolve a failing 
financial firm in case of emergency.114  Indeed, the OLA’s mechanisms for establishing a 
bridge financial company and recapitalizing the bridge company through convertible debt are 
uniquely suited to responding to the risks of imminent financial collapse.115  By contrast, the 
prudential regulations accompanying nonbank SIFI designations are generally designed to 
prevent nonbank financial firms from experiencing distress in the first place. It is therefore 
apparent that Congress expected FSOC to use SIFI designations as an ex ante crisis prevention 
strategy that was analytically distinct from the ex post emergency response tool that the 
Council envisions in the proposed guidance.   
 
                                           
 
112
 Proposed Guidance, supra note 7, at 9,045 n.21.   
113
 See Gelzinis, supra note 6. 
114 See supra Section II.E. 
115 By law, firms that are resolved through the OLA need not have been previously designated as nonbank 
SIFIs.  As discussed above, however, the OLA process is unlikely to work as intended if the Council has not 
designated the relevant nonbank as a SIFI far in advance of its distress. 
